

Presskonferens i Tallinn 251216

Olycksutredningsmyndigheterna i Estland, Finland och Sverige presenterade sin gemensamma slutrapport vid en pressträff i Tallinn.

Tid: Tisdag 16 december 2025, kl. 15.00-16.30 (EET) (14.00 svensk tid) **Plats:** Tallinn

Cruise Terminal (adress: Logi tn 4/2, Tallinn)

Talare vid pressträffen:

- Märt Ots, Chef för den estniska utredningsmyndigheten, OJK (Estland)
- Tauri Roosipuu, Utredningsledare, OJK (Estland)
- Jonas Bäckstrand, Utredningsordförande, SHK (Sverige)
- Jörgen Zachau, Utredningsledare, SHK (Sverige)
- Risto Haimila, Ledande utredare, OTKES (Finland)
- Moderator: Tiina Bieber, Kommunikationschef, OTKES (Finland)

Bilder visade

s 2
s 4 - 8
s 3
s 9 -11

Agenda

- Översikt av den preliminära bedömningen av förlisningen av M/V ESTONIA s 2 - 3
- Presentation av resultat och slutsatser från den preliminära bedömningen s 4 - 11
- Frågor och enskilda intervjuer

Bilder nedan med referenser till slutrapporten

Final Report of Preliminary Assessment of New Findings on M/V ESTONIA Accident

Sammanställt av

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Översikt av den preliminära bedömningen av förlisningen av M/V ESTONIA

Märt Ots, Chef för den estniska utredningsmyndigheten, OJK (Estland)

Inledning:

2020 Discovery "Documentary"

- On 28 September 2020 new video footage was published
- On 2 October 2020 the OJK initiated a Preliminary Assessment (PA) of the new findings with the assistance of SHK and SIAF
- On 23 January 2023 the Intermediate Report of the PA was published

Objectives of the Preliminary Assessment

- to identify the cause of penetrating deformation(s) to the hull of MV ESTONIA, seen in the new video footage aired in Sep-2020 by Monster Media Group Limited
- to assess whether the new information gives reason to revise the conclusions presented in the JAIC Final Report
- to assess which new investigative measures should be taken, if any
- to assess whether the safety investigation of the sinking of MV ESTONIA should be re-opened

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Jonas Bäckstrand, Utredningsordförande, SHK (Sverige)

Inledning:

Planning and Preparation

- Amended legislation
- Procurements and cooperation with other authorities
- Presurvey – 2021
- Photogrammetry – 2022
- Car deck filming and ramp recovery – 2023
- Surrounding survey – 2023
- Verification of findings – 2024

Avslutning:

Differences from JAIC

- Based on witness statements we conclude that the sequence of events started just after 01.00 (EET) – some 15 minutes before what JAIC estimated
- MV ESTONIA was not seaworthy due to shortcomings in design, building, inspection and certification processes. She should not have been operating on the Tallinn – Stockholm route

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
Presentation av resultat och slutsatser från den preliminära bedömningen**Tauri Roosipuu, Utredningsledare, OJK (Estland)**

FIG. 3.4: Reconstructed top bedrock surface with a partial model of the wreck. The bedrock surface is based on the 2024 reconstruction.[47] The layers between the seabed and the bedrock are not shown. The wreck is shown primarily as measured during the photogrammetry survey (O 2.20); as the photogrammetry did not image below the seabed layer (not shown here), the parts of the wreck currently extending below the seabed are not shown.



FIG. 3.26: Top view of the five reconstructed positions of the wreck from 1994 to 2023

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(Sep-1994, Dec-1994, May-1995 to Sep-1997, Aug-2000, Jul-2021 to Nov-2023)




FIG. 0.2: A sectional cut at midships, near the forward penetrating damage, illustrates the wreck's movement over the decades.




FIG. 3.34: Wreck side damage and the corresponding seabed on the digital model.



FIG. 3.35: Wreck side damage and the corresponding seabed on the digital model, side view.

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


FIG. 3.42: Wreck deformations on theoretical FEM model after bottom contact with the bedrock. Damage stemming from direct impact with the bedrock under wreck's own weight is illustrated. However, the full descent was not simulated and the full extent of deformations were not included. 'Brown' is the bedrock; 'Pink' illustrates penetrating damage. Source: Tabri and Heinvee



FIG. 4.5: Physical damage of the bow visor and the ramp confirming the full opening of the vessel's bow entrance at the beginning of the accident. The large dent in the front side of the visor (red) is aligned with the bulbous bow and the ramp's (yellow) underside deformations are aligned with the forepeak deck. Visor actuators are not shown.

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


FIG. 4.6: Visualization of the numerical flooding process in the HSVA-Rolls program, illustrating the flooding of the car deck from ahead seas: sloshing water is divided by the centre casing (visible walls not included). Accumulation of water to the port side of the centre casing creates water pressure to non-watertight sliding doors (fire doors). Source: Kim et al.



FIG. 4.7: Sliding fire door on the car deck of MV MARE BALTICUM, the near-sistership of MV ESTONIA. Source: Börje Stenström, 1995-11-07, SHK Archives, F 1 HB. 23A B15.6.

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


FIG. 4.4: Proposed tracks during the flooding and sinking of MV ESTONIA by JAIC, Valanto, and Kim et al.[1], [2], [3] The main reference points of the vessel's track reconstructions are shown.





FIG. 4.8: Lowest ventilation openings on the starboard side of the vessel opening to outer shell. 'Red' indicates ventilation channels running below the car deck and 'Yellow' to the car deck. Ventilation channels on other side of the vessel and openings only inside are not shown. Non-weathertight sliding fire doors and elevator doors on the first level of car deck in 'Red'. Other doors and hatches on the car deck are not highlighted.



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Jörgen Zachau, Utredningsledare, SHK (Sverige)




FIG. 5.1: Diagram showing performed interviews. Altogether, 68 survivors were interviewed 2021 – 2024. The JAIC interviews may include interviews conducted by police in 1995 and 1996.

Military Transport

- 2 witnesses claiming they saw military vehicles
- 9 witnesses claiming otherwise
 - 4 connected to a personal memory from the loading operation

Military Transport

- 2 witnesses claiming they saw military vehicles
- 9 witnesses claiming otherwise
 - 4 connected to a personal memory from the loading operation
- **Conclusions**
 - it is unlikely that military vehicles were loaded onboard
 - we do not know the cargo of vehicles
 - the cargo, whatever it may have been, has nothing to do with the sinking

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FIG. 5.3: Footage from the car deck shows a cargo securing chock next to the shifted cargo unit on the car deck of MV ESTONIA during the visual inspection in 2023 (O 2.21).



FIG. 5.4: The left image shows an empty space for lashings, while the right shows lashings stored and not being used. Footage from the car deck, made 2023.

Initiation of Evacuation

- Crashes or bangs
- Metallic scraping sound
- Happened very fast

• Conclusion

- Sounds heard and immediate listing are congruent to what to expect on such an occasion

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FIG. 5.5: Extract from Deck 1 drawing. The red dots show location of the survivors as highlighted in the JAIC [Final Report](#). [3, p. 68] The yellow dots show location of those not indicated by JAIC (the one outside cannot be connected to a certain cabin). All survivors on the image have not been interviewed 2021 – 2024, thus may not be mentioned in the text. Altogether, at least 25 survivors evacuated from Deck 1. The starboard side forward and aftward penetrating damage is marked by red rhombs.

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